

IPv6 for the InfoSec Pro On the Go

Allan Stojanovic
University of Toronto
#include disclaimer.h

Before We Begin


- First RFCs published December 1995
- 432 RFCs about or affecting IPv6
 - 234 Standards Track
 - 163 Informational
 - 27 Experimental
 - 8 Best Current Practice
 - 46 Obsolete
- Numbers are a little old (mid 2015?)

Nothing I tell you is false, but not all may prove to be true.

Agenda

- IPv6 Basics
- Default Behaviour
- Infrastructure notes
- Tools and Technology
- My Goal

Basics



IPv6 Basics

- Size
- Representation
- Interfaces
- Transitions

RFC2460

Internet Protocol Version 6 Specification

IPv6 Basics - Size

- IPv6 addresses are 128 bits long
- Each Regional Internet Registry gets multiple /23 blocks
 - Divided into 512 /32 blocks
- One /32 for each ISP
 - Divided into 65,536 /48 blocks
- One /48 for each ISP's Customer
 - Divided into 65,536 /64 networks internally

Still in Flux? Some talk of /56 assignments

IPv6 Basics – Size (2)

- *All IPv6:* $2^{128} =$
340,282,366,920,938,463,463,374,607,431,768,211,456
- *ISP:* $2^{96} =$
79,228,162,514,264,337,593,543,950,336
- *Customer:* $2^{80} =$
1,208,925,819,614,629,174,706,176
- *Smallest Subnet:* $2^{64} =$
18,446,744,073,709,551,616

* Wolfram Alpha

PRO TIP!

Describe the amount of space in terms of the number of Internets!

Let **cI** (classic Internet) = 2^{32}

Therefore

Smallest IPv6 Subnet of 2^{64} hosts = **cI²**

AKA

An Internet of Internets!

IPv6 Basics - Representation

- 8 groups of 16 bits each written as 4 hex characters
 - 2001:0034:0000:0000:0000:FF45:A6B3:0D3B
- From any group, leading zeros can be removed
 - 2001:34:0:0:0:FF45:A6B3:D3B
- Any consecutive set of zeros can be “collapsed” to “::”
 - 2001:34::FF45:A6B3:D3B
- Therefore Loopback:
 - 0000:0000:0000:0000:0000:0000:0000:0001
- Becomes:
 - ::1

IPv6 Basics – Representations (2)

- Networks are represented as CIDR Prefixes
 - `2001:2::/48` or `2001:4:112::/48`
- Reserved spaces
 - `2000::/3` Global Unicast (~ cI^{3.90})
 - `FE80::/10` Link Scoped Unicast (~ cI^{3.69})
 - i.e. `FE80::1111%eth0` or `FE80::1111%1`
 - `FF00::/8` Multicast
 - Others and subsets

PRO TIP!

- When writing your own code, remember to normalize your IPv6 addresses.
- Check that software you rely upon does as well.
- **Hint:** Try not to store them as strings
- But you already do this right?

IPv6 Basics – Representations (3)

- IPv4 Compatible addresses
 - Defined as `::/96` (`::192.168.0.2` or `::C0A8:2`)
 - Used to connect IPv6 over IPv4 networks
 - Deprecated
- IPv4 Mapped addresses
 - Defined as `::FFFF::/96`
 - `::FFFF:192.168.0.2` or `::FFFF:C0A8:2`
 - Used to connect IPv4 applications to IPv6 Sockets

Both of these are transition technologies

PRO TIP!

- By the way “::” is the IPv6 equivalent of “0.0.0.0”
- Also “::FFFF:” is the same as “::ffff:”
 - but capitals are easier to read

IPv6 Basics – Interfaces

- Each interface can have multiple IPv6 addresses
 - How many is OS dependent it seems
 - Linux configuration limit of 16
 - Sometime necessary to add %interface to the address
- “All modern devices run both IPv4 and IPv6”
 - Some VoIP phones do not
 - Android SLAAC only?
 - Desktop and server OS’s are OK
- All in addition to the usual IPv4 setup


IPv6 Basics – Transitions

- NAT64/DNS64
- 6to4 (community wants this deprecated 2011)
- ISATAP (look for prefix fe80::0200:5efe:)
- IPv6 Automatic Routing
- 6over4 (uses IPv4 multicast)
- Teredo (Miredo software last changes 2013?)
- PortProxy (MS only, not just IPv6)

NAT64 and DNS64

- Meant for pure IPv6 networks
- NAT64 (**RFC6146**)
 - An interface in each space
 - A gateway translating IPv6 to IPv4
- DNS64
 - A DNS server that returns temp IPv6 addresses for IPv4 only services
 - Used to get IPv6-only endpoints to the NAT64

Default Behaviour



Default Behaviours

- Stateless Address Auto-configuration (RFC4862)
- Privacy extensions (RFC4941)
- Neighbor Discovery Protocol (RFC4861)
 - Neighbour Solicitation and Advertisement
 - Router Solicitation and Advertisement
 - Redirection

Default - SLAAC

- Derived from IEEE addresses (if available)
 - 00:01:02:AA:BB:CC
- Split it in half, and insert “FF:FE”
 - 00:01:02:FF:FE:AA:BB:CC
- Flip the second last bit in the first eight
 - 02:01:02:FF:FE:AA:BB:CC (64 bit address)
- Prepend the prefix and rewrite
 - FE80::0201:02FF:FEAA:BBCC (128 bit link address)

PRO TIP!

- This is why the smallest network is a /64 or always will be
- RFCs state that a interface identifier should be used to generate a unique address.
- Hardware address is a natural fit, but there needs to be other ways (non-ether protocols?)

Default – SLAAC (2)

- Treat newly generated address as “Tentative”
- Perform Duplicate Address Detection (DAD)
- If no duplicate address detected
 - Assign to the interface
 - Set expiry (always “forever” on link-local)
 - Set preference (always “preferred” on link-local)
- Else
 - Stop (choke; no retry; no other MAC?)

PRO TIP!

- If you monitor for DAD and respond, you can DoS networks.

Default – Privacy Extensions

- Create additional global addresses for new outbound connections!
- Make them temporary
 - a few hours to a few days
- Make them random
 - next address always unpredictable
 - But re-creatable!

PRO TIP!

- Each address is also a “listening” address (naturally)
- Privacy extensions are not on by default in Mac OSX.

Default – Neighbor Discovery Protocol

- Protocol for node communication on the same link ([RFC 4861](#))
- Sort of like:
 - IPv4's ARP
 - ICMP Router Discovery
 - ICMP Redirect
- Also has Neighbor Unreachability Detection
- Uses multi-cast addressing (not broadcast)
 - FF02::1 for all-nodes
 - FF02::2 for all-routers
 - And others...

All done via ICMPv6

PRO TIP!

- ICMPv6 provides much more functionality than ICMPv4. Be very careful what you choose to block at firewalls.
- But blocking unsolicited router advertisements is a good idea

Default – Neighbor Solicitation and Advertisement

- Solicitations
 - Multicast ICMP to resolve an address
 - Multicast address FF02::1
 - Unicast to confirm reachability
- Advertisements
 - In response to solicitation
 - Without solicitation, used to propagate changes

PRO TIP!

Multicast Address	Reason
FF02::1	All Nodes
FF02::2	All Routers
FF02::1:2	All DHCPv6 Agents

There are many more.

If you ping6 these addresses, you will get interesting results! Including multiple “Duplicate” responses similar to pinging broadcast addresses.

These 3 should be particularly interesting to pentesters.

PS: [there is no broadcast address any more](#)

Default – Router

Solicitation and Advertisement

- Same as Neighbor Solicitation and Advertisement except also contains:
 - address space advertised (global address prefix)
 - Preference/priority (high, med, low)
 - Router lifetime / prefix lifetime
 - Flags including “Managed” and “OtherConfig”
- Does not contain anything that could be considered “authentication” or “proof-of-source”

PRO TIP!

- **33:33:00:00:00:00 – 33:33:FF:FF:FF:FF** are reserved for IPv6 Multicast at the ethernet layer.
- It is possible to (re)play an “advertisement” packet directly to an end node by changing the dest ether address to that of the end node
- In the case of router advertisements, the end node could be tricked into assigning itself an address in a different prefix

Default – DHCPv6

- **RFC3315**
- If router advertisement has “Managed” or “OtherConfig” flag set, get info from DHCPv6
- Requires endpoint configuration
 - Linux NetworkManager is SLAAC by default can be set to use DHCPv6 (ignores flags?)
 - DHCPClient must run a second instance with “-6” switch

Default – DUID


- The host identifier is this DHCP Unique Identifier
- In **RFC3315**
 - Type 1: Link Layer Address plus Time (DUID-LLT)
 - Type 2: Enterprise Number (DUID-EN)
 - Type 3: Link Layer Address (DUID-LL)
- In **RFC6355**
 - Type 4: A created UUID (DUID-UUID)
- DHCPv6 does not define the use of MAC as an identifier
- A lot of alternative servers popping up that do

DUID: DHCP Unique Identifier

PRO TIP!

- In ISC DHCPv6 address reservations are set by DUID, not hardware address
- In some cases, hardware address is extractable from the DUID but not if DUID-EN or DUID-UUID is used.
- Ubuntu uses DUID-UUID
- Android doesn't support DHCPv6
- But you can get hardware address from a DHCP proxy (same box?)

Infrastructure Notes



Infrastructures

- All-default (non-)configuration
 - AKA the “ignored”
- Minimal Configuration
 - AKA the “explored”
- Turned off and/or disabled
 - AKA the “removed”
- Complete Configuration
 - AKA the “matured”

PRO TIP!

- BTW, did I mention that there is no NAT?

Infrastructures - Ignored

- Devices have FE80:: addresses
- Devices are asking for router information
 - But not finding any
- Some internal communication
 - Service discovery
- No controls / detection mechanisms
 - And sometimes incapable controls (ie. Firewalls)
- Probably the majority for years to come

PRO TIP!

- Firewalls that cannot control IPv6 just let it though (Cisco FWASM)
- Blanket denies in IPv4 can be forgotten in IPv6
- iptables and ip6tables: two separate commands

Infrastructures - Explored

- Has a router advertising an IPv6 prefix
- Might have a DHCPv6 server
- Dual Stacks
 - Traffic defaults to IPv6 when available
- Set DNS server via prefix advert
(RFC6106)
- Tunnelled?

PRO TIP!

- If you set your IPv6 router to the highest priority, it will be slightly harder to introduce a rogue router
- Forging redirects may still be an effective attack even if you do the above

Infrastructures - Removed

- “Don’t understand / can’t support. Therefore turning it off.”
- Easy to do with central configuration mgmt
 - Or via gold images?
- A little harder for IoT and “appliances”
 - There will always be something that remains
- Actively blocks / alerts on IPv6

PRO TIP!

- If you choose to disable IPv6 on your network(s), then setting up alerts when IPv6 is detected is an excellent way to detect a rogue device.
- Isolating devices that cannot have IPv6 turned off may be a good idea as well.


Infrastructures - Matured

- One or more routers advertising large prefixes
- DHCPv6 possibly with dynamic DNS
- DNS64 and NAT64
- SEcure Neighbor Discovery ([RFC3971](#)
[RFC6494](#))
- Ready to run as a pure IPv6 network
only anecdotal; haven't seen one

PRO TIP!

- “Naming” servers and subnets is strongly suggested.
- If you have 2001:501:1DD:0000::/56
 - Servers: 2001:501:1DD:AA::/64
 - Workstations: 2001:501:1DD:1:/64
 - ServerDev: 2001:501:1DD:BB::/64
 - Guest: 2001:501:1DD:FF::/64
- Notice not using :0000::/64 to avoid possible confusion
- Also, easier to see where traffic is from/to

Tools and Technology



Tools and Technology

- SEND ([RFC3971](#) [RFC6494](#))
- THC-IPv6
- Scanners
- Python and Scapy Library

Secure Neighbor Discovery (SEND)

- Extended Neighbor discovery options that provide:
 - An authorization delegation discovery process
 - an address ownership proof mechanism
 - and requirements for the use of these components in Neighbor Discovery Protocol
- Requires pretty extensive PKI
 - Cryptographically Generated Addresses
 - Certificates and “trust anchors”
 - Signing all ND packets (in RSA with max 2048 bit?)

Secure Neighbor Discovery (SEND)

- RFC says “SEND is applicable in environments where physical security on the link is not assured ...”
 - What did physical security look like in 2005?
- Do we trust the physical security of ANY network?
- Wireless is called out specifically as not physically secure (surprise)

THC-IPv6 Attack Framework

- <https://www.thc.org/thc-ipv6/>
- An excellent set of tools and libraries
 - Now with public development on github
- In my env's some work and some do not
- Old, but kept up to date. v3.0 released this year.
- Strongly recommend running “alive6” as part of any recon.

Scanners


- Specifically calling out NMAP and MASSCAN
- NMAP
 - Scans known IPv6 targets as expected
 - Implements Neighbor Discovery scan as -6 -PR
 - Takes a long time to ND scan even a /64
 - Can address smaller than /64
- MASSCAN
 - Cannot do IPv6 today
 - But if it could, and it scaled linearly, a /64 would take 33 days with a single 10Gbit interface

Python and Scapy library

- Scapy is a “packet rolling” library for python
- It has rich support for IPv6
- Very easy to use
- This is how to generate a Router Advertisement packet:

```
Ether()/IPv6()/ICMPv6ND_RA()/ICMPv6NDOptPrefixInfo(prefix='aaaa:aaaa:aaaa:aaaa::',prefixlen=64)
```

My Goals




Automated MITM

- Includes:
 - A rogue router
 - A dhcpv6 server
 - A NAT64/DNS64 install
- Interfaces
 - One IPv4 and One IPv6
 - Wifi connectivity
- Trying to see how far I can get with each of the infrastructure types

Automated MITM (2)

- Abilities:
 - Find and suppress installed routers (if necessary)
 - Find and suppress DHCPv6 servers (might not need to)
 - Target specific nodes or entire networks
 - Redirect traffic via local NAT64/DNS64 and do the usual tricks
- Today:
 - Advertise a specific prefix to any node chosen by MAC
 - Suppress targeted routers
 - but this breaks the network at the moment


Help?



Help?

- Transition technologies
- IPv6 and Mobile
- SEND implementation (and TCO)
- IPv6 and IoT
- Automated MITM

Epilogue



RFC1924 Base85

- Base85 representation of IPv6 addresses
- Makes this:
 - 2606:aa00:400:402:3008:f8b:5c7c:f645
- Look like this:
 - b7gxONQAq42t8cj~PXPu
- Turns out it was an April Fool's RFC from 1996
 - I spent longer on this than I care to admit

Questions?



@allansto

allan.stojanovic(at)utoronto.ca ⁵⁹

BACKUPS!

IPv6 Basics – Multi-Routing

- Each stack can have multiple DEFAULT routes
 - Plus routers can tell you to go elsewhere
- Plus each DHCPv6 static route
- Plus tunnel / transition routes
- Plus all the classic IPv4 routing stuff

More on this later

Home routing Multiple ISPs?

Shortness of IPv6 /64?

IPv6 on mobile

Transitions and Translations

Point to point encryption

SEND

IPv6mcast_ff:3d:66:8d (33:33:ff:3d:66:8d)

Android Cyanogen never makes a dhcpv6 request

IOT inventory no-v6 or half-v6?

PRO TIP!

IPv6 Default – Autoconfig

- SLAC
- permanent
- Temporary
- <http://www.iana.org/assignments/ipv6-address-space>.